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Abstract Despite considerable interest in both action percep-
tion and social attention over the last 2 decades, there has been
surprisingly little investigation concerning how the manual
actions of other humans orient visual attention. The present
review draws together studies that have measured the
orienting of attention, following observation of another’s
goal-directed action. Our review proposes that, in line with
the literature on eye gaze, action is a particularly strong
orienting cue for the visual system. However, we additionally
suggest that action may orient visual attention using mecha-
nisms, which gaze direction does not (i.e., neural direct map-
ping and corepresentation). Finally, we review the implica-
tions of these gaze-independent mechanisms for the study of
attention to action. We suggest that our understanding of at-
tention to action may benefit from being studied in the context
of joint action paradigms, where the role of higher level action
goals and social factors can be investigated.
Keywords Social cognition . Eyemovements and visual
attention .Motor control
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in how visual
attention is influenced by our interactions with other people.
Numerous everyday activities, during which the most funda-
mental cognitive processes are engaged, do not take place in
isolation but alongside other people. For example, many oc-
cupations, which tax the highest levels of human performance,
such as surgical procedures or piloting commercial aircraft,
take place alongside coactors who’s attention can influence
that of others. Cognitive and social psychologists therefore
wish to study these interactions in order to better understand
how they might shape processes such as attention. Intuitively,
another’s activity might influence our own attention in a num-
ber of ways. We can be affected by where they are looking,
what we know their interests or motivations to be, or by how
they move their body and act. Nonetheless, attention to the
manual and bodily actions of other humans has received little
consideration. Indeed, it is common for action observation
studies, including review articles, to make no reference to
attentional orienting, or ‘attention’ at all (e.g., Atmaca,
Sebanz, Prinz, & Knoblich, 2008; Braun, Ortega, & Wolpert,
2011; Galantucci & Sebanz, 2009; Paulus & Moore, 2007;
Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011). It is hoped
that understanding how attention might be influenced by these
phenomena will lead psychologists to a richer account of it as a
useful tool for understanding brain and behaviour.
Attention in the Social World
Orienting visual attention
In this context, attention refers to the aligning of a sense organ
or of cognitive recourses to a particular object or area of the
environment, including to one or more features of the respec-
tive object or area. Features of an object or of visual space may
include, for example, a particular shape, colour, or movement
direction. The result of this alignment is that the attended area
or feature can be processed more effectively, at the expense of
other unattended areas or features. The direction of attention
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allows humans to focus processing capacity on the most sa-
lient or behaviourally relevant features of the environment. In
vision, this sensory alignment can be achieved by movement
of the eyes. Around three times per second, the eyes are
moved in abrupt, rapid movements known as saccades.
Additionally, between saccades, the eyes will rest and extract
visual information during periods known as fixations. With a
large array of complex and competing visual information, sac-
cades and fixations are guided in such a way to facilitate
behavioural goals—a process known as attentional orienting.
In addition to orienting attention by alignment of the eyes,
however, it has been shown that certain objects and locations
within the visual field can be processed more effectively than
others when the eyes are stationary. The observation that ‘the
mind’s eye’ can attend to certain areas or features of the envi-
ronment over others, in the absence of eye movements, has led
to the distinction between overt attention, where orienting
occurs with eye and head movements, and covert attention,
where attention is oriented in the absence of eye movements
(Itti & Koch, 2000; Posner, 1980). Furthermore, attention is
thought to be directed in two ways (Jonides, 1981). It can be
captured by stimuli in a bottom-up, reflexive, or exogenous
way and can also be directed voluntarily, according to top-
down, or endogenous mechanisms. This distinction funda-
mentally rests on whether attention is directed externally or
internally. For example, exogenous external directors might
include the appearance of a new object, motion onset, or an
abrupt luminance change. In contrast, endogenous internal
factors can include one’s goals in visual search or one’s un-
derstanding of the meaning of stimuli.
Orienting to social cues: The case of gaze
Social attention can be defined as the study of how areas of
space, objects, or their features are selectively processed de-
pending upon the real or implied presence of other people, and
the way information about other people is processed. Other
humans can act as a cue to attention in several ways. For
example, another’s eyes, head, or limbs are targets that can
be a focus for attention in many contexts. These anatomical
targets may themselves guide and cue attention to other as-
pects of the environment, such as when one points to an object
of interest. Furthermore, the presence of another person—real
or imagined—can influence how one attends to the human
and nonhuman environment. For example, another’s social
status or the presence of competition with them can influence
which features of the environment are attended to when peo-
ple interact (e.g., Gobel, Kim, & Richardson, 2015; Vick &
Anderson, 2003). Moreover, our beliefs about the presence of
other people may influence how we attend to their anatomy or
the focus of their gaze, such as when we might ignore a tele-
vision picture of another’s face but attend to them carefully
during a live video conference (e.g., Laidlaw, Foulsham,
Kuhn, & Kingstone, 2011). Needless to say, these factors
can interact; thus, all are relevant to the study of social
attention.
Much of the research effort directed at understanding social
attention has focused on the role of eye gaze and head direc-
tion (see Birmingham & Kingstone, 2009; Frischen, Bayliss,
& Tipper, 2007, for reviews). The reasoning behind this ap-
proach is that such observable cues provide an indication of
where the focus of another’s attention is. As social organisms,
these indicators may therefore provide particularly strong cues
to orient our own attention, which can help in the achievement
of other behavioural goals (e.g., Hare, Call, & Tomasello,
1998; Tomasello, Call, & Hare, 1998). Both covert and overt
attention have been investigated in this respect, and common
to both approaches has been an attempt to determine whether
social cues are special in orienting attention when compared to
other kinds of directional or symbolic stimuli (for example,
schematic arrows or language).
Covert attention
In the case of covert attention, much of the work on gaze and
arrow cueing has employed the Posner cueing paradigm
(Posner, 1978, 1980), which established a number of currently
accepted characteristics of attentional orienting. In this proce-
dure, participants are asked to manually detect or identify a
target onset following a cue. Cues can either be congruent
with the direction or location of subsequent targets or incon-
gruent with them. Shorter RTs to previously cued targets are
thought to show that attention has been oriented by the cue.
The investigation of both arrow and eye gaze stimuli in covert
paradigms has a much longer history than the equivalent ap-
proaches for eye-movement measures. Early work
established, a subsequently long-held position, that
nonpredictive arrow cues do not orient covert attention to
the location of subsequent targets (Jonides, 1981). It later
emerged however, that central arrows can shift covert atten-
tion at longer stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA; approxi-
mately 300 ms), whereas asynchronies required by peripheral
stimuli (e.g., luminance changes) can be as little as 100 ms
(Cheal & Lyon, 1991). This finding was thought to show that
centrally presented directional cues were only able to direct
attention to peripheral locations endogenously, in contrast to
cues in peripheral locations themselves, which capture atten-
tion exogenously.
Friesen and Kingstone (1998) first investigated the effects
of gaze as a central cue, using a variant of the Posner cueing
paradigm, and established that these cues induced a rapid ef-
fect (from 105 ms SOA onwards), which was present when
gaze direction was nonpredictive and to be ignored by partic-
ipants. These findings were interpreted as showing that, con-
trary to central arrow cues, central gaze cues could induce an
automatic shift of covert attention. Further support for this
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position was offered by the finding that even counter-
predictive gaze cues could direct attention at up to 700 ms
SOA (Driver et al., 1999).
Nonetheless, since the original gaze cueing studies, evi-
dence has emerged that directional cues such as arrows may
also have reflexive characteristics in orienting attention
(Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, & Godijn, 2001; Quadflieg,
Mason, & Macrae, 2004; Ristic, Friesen, & Kingstone,
2002 ; Tipp le s , 2002) , bo th in the presence o f
counterpredictive cues and very short SOAs. Recent work
(Gibson & Bryant, 2005) has suggested that the long-held
view that arrows represent a voluntary orienting cue may have
been based upon the extremely brief presentation of arrow
cues (e.g., 25 ms) used in Jonides’s (1981) original study.
Despite other attempts to demonstrate the greater reflexivity
of gaze than arrow cues, recent work has suggested automatic
shifts of attention with both directional stimuli (Friesen,
Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004; Tipples, 2008).
Although both arrows and gaze orient attention reflexively,
they may differ when it comes to inhibition of return (IOR;
Posner & Cohen, 1984). IOR refers to the finding that after
approximately 300 ms, RTs to targets that are preceded by a
peripheral transient cue (e.g., a luminance change or the ap-
pearance of a new object) will be slowed when cues are con-
gruent rather than incongruent (Klein, 2000; Taylor & Klein,
1998). So the facilitatory effect of a peripheral transient cue
becomes inhibitory after about 300 ms. At much longer SOAs
(e.g., 1,200 ms), gaze cueing has also been shown to cause
inhibitory effects (Frischen& Tipper, 2004). However, even at
these longer SOAs, this effect has not proved reliable without
the presence of a central transient event to redirect attention
away from the target location (Frischen, Smilek, Eastwood, &
Tipper, 2007; McKee, Christie, & Klein, 2007).
In summary, the behavioural evidence favours the view that
gaze cues are roughly equivalent to other well-learned direc-
tional symbols such as arrows. Gaze and symbolic cues can
orient attention reflexively; however, neither orient attention
with the same characteristics as low-level, peripheral transient
cues. The same evidence subsequently suggests that attention
shifts to gaze and other directional cues relies upon domain-
general orienting processes rather than on a set of domain-
specific mechanisms, unique to eye gaze.
Overt attention
In the case of overt attention, researchers have found that eye
gaze cues, which are typically presented centrally in a visual
display, will reduce reaction times (RTs) to make voluntary
saccades to a target, when the gaze cue and target are in the
same direction (Ricciardelli, Bricolo, Aglioti, & Chelazzi,
2002). This will occur even if the cues do not predict where
the target will appear. Given that for overt attention, the gaze
cue is directly congruent with the direction of a performed
motor behaviour (i.e., the cue and participant look the same
way), many authors suggest that this and similar results may
be due to facilitation and interference from observed oculo-
motor preparation (Mansfield, Farroni, & Johnson, 2003;
Nummenmaa & Hietanen, 2006; Quintana et al., 2003). This
position, which can be called the ‘gaze imitation hypothesis’,
posits that observed eye gaze causes the activation of an ocu-
lomotor program in the observer, and that this subsequently
affects the performance of the same gaze behaviour. The gaze
behaviour that is supposedly imitated is goal-centred, such
that an observed gaze in the same direction is imitated, rather
than the oculomotor program per se, which would result in a
saccade in the opposite direction when another person is op-
posite the observer.
Further studies found that gaze cues did not induce errors
on incongruent movements. This was replicated using equiv-
alent schematic stimuli by Kuhn and Benson (2007), who
additionally found that incongruent arrow cues could induce
such errors in subsequent eye movements. Further evidence
against the gaze imitation hypothesis comes from the obser-
vation that manual tasks can show a greater gaze cueing effect
than saccadic tasks (Friesen & Kingstone, 2003). In addition,
Koval, Thomas, and Everling (2005) found that in the case of
antisaccades (where participants are instructed to make an eye
movement in the opposite direction of a target), RTs are
shorter following gaze cues that are congruent with these tar-
gets. In Koval et al.’s study, therefore, interference was not
observed from gaze cues that were spatially incongruent with
the targets towards which they were asked to saccade. As
such, their study implies automatic imitation, and saccadic
motor contagion does not influence subsequent eyemovement
behaviour. In contrast, the authors suggest that saccade prep-
aration is dependent upon the particular task, or goal, driving
the saccadic behaviour. Despite these findings, the possibility
remains that the task or goal of another’s saccadic behaviour
may be imitated and somoderate gaze following. Studies have
yet to probe this question in the case of oculomotor measures
of gaze following, despite recent interest in the influence of
higher level goal states in social attention (e.g., Teufel, Alexis,
Clayton, & Davis, 2010; Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel &
Müller, 2012). The possibility of goal-imitation in saccadic
behaviour therefore remains an interesting avenue for further
work.
Despite evidence inconsistent with the assertion that gaze
cues elicit imitative behaviour, they have consistently been
shown to be a powerful cue for attention. Indeed, some evi-
dence has pointed at the ability of others’ gaze to orient atten-
tion automatically. In favour of this position, at very short
intervals between the onset of a cue and a saccade target
(i.e., SOA), gaze cues have been shown to interfere with sac-
cade RTs, even when these cues are more likely to be in the
opposite direction of targets (Kuhn & Kingstone, 2009).
Nonetheless, the same study found that an equivalent pattern
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of results was elicited by arrow cues, similarly casting doubt
upon whether eye gaze represents a special class of directional
cue for overt attention. This ‘nothing special’ position has also
found support in studies investigating saccade trajectories
(Hermens & Walker, 2010).
Gaze, social attention, and the brain
In contrast to behavioural data, stronger support for special-
ized systems that orient to eye gaze comes from neurological
findings. Evidence is primarily based upon the differential
activation of these areas during gaze cueing, in comparison
to other stimuli. Whilst the neural areas identified are certainly
not unique to gaze cueing, they are not generally identified
with other attentional processes (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).
Regions thought to be uniquely associated with orienting to
social and biological, versus nonbiological cues, are also iden-
tified as those which code for the perception of eye move-
ments and the direction of eye gaze (Akiyama et al., 2006;
Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Hietanen, Nummenmaa,
Nyman, Parkkola, & Hämäläinen, 2006).
The superior temporal sulcus (STS) is an area consistently
identified as being sensitive to judgments about eye gaze in
humans (Calder et al., 2007; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Perrett
et al., 1985). A number of studies have established that in the
case of the STS (although not adjacent regions, such as the
superior temporal gyrus), greater activation occurs for judg-
ments of gaze direction when compared with other directional
cues (Hietanen, Leppänen, Nummenmaa, & Astikainen,
2008; Hietanen et al., 2006; Hooker et al., 2003; C. M.
Tipper, Handy, Giesbrecht, & Kingstone, 2008). The STS
has dense connections to the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), which
is important in covert attention shifts and spatial processing
(Corbetta et al., 1998; Harries & Perrett, 1991; Materna,
Dicke, & Thier, 2008; Rafal, 1996). The role of these connec-
tions has found support in studies that have correlated STS
activation with activity in IPS under conditions where averted
gaze (i.e., where gaze is directed away from the observer) is
viewed (George, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Pelphrey,
Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 2003; Wicker, Michel,
Henaff, &Decety, 1998). Although the IPS has generally been
shown to undergo greater activation following averted rather
than direct gaze (i.e., when gaze is directed at the observer;
Hoffman & Haxby, 2000), unlike the STS it is not thought to
be sensitive to biological cues. Both socially relevant and
nonsocially relevant directional judgments have been found
to elicit activation in this area (Materna et al., 2008).
There is certainly disagreement regarding whether a gaze-
orienting network is separable from regions associated with
other kinds of orienting (Birmingham & Kingstone, 2009;
Rombough, Barrie, & Iarocci, 2012). However, there is now
a raft of evidence in humans and nonhuman primates to sup-
port the involvement of the STS and IPS in orienting to gaze
and head direction and thus supporting social attention.
Nonetheless, as the following discussion will highlight, the
STS and IPS are by no means uniquely implicated in process-
ing gaze or face information. In fact, these areas are associated
with a range of tasks, including body orientation and the per-
ception of manual and whole-body biological motion
(Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & Perrett, 2000; Saxe, Xiao,
Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004; van Kemenade,
Muggleton, Walsh, & Saygin, 2012).
The neural basis of attention to action
The past 15 to 20 years has witnessed a surge in interest in the
neural mechanisms which support action perception in both
human and nonhuman primates. Much of this research began
with the discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque monkey.
Mirror neurons are cells in premotor and parietal areas that
respond to both the performance and observation of a goal-
directed action. These neurons are thought to be sensitive to
the goal state of observed actions, such that a commonly ob-
served and performed action selectively activates a specific
population of cells (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese,
& Rizzolatti, 1992; Fogassi et al., 2005; Gallese, Fadiga,
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Umiltà et al., 2001). Mirror neu-
rons are therefore proposed to map an observed goal-directed
action directly to one that is subsequently performed.
Investigations with humans have also supported the presence
of single cell mirror neurons (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan,
Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). Furthermore, neuroimaging studies
in humans have demonstrated the association of a widespread
network of cortical areas involved in the understanding and
performance of goal-directed actions, thus supporting the ex-
istence of a human ‘mirror neuron system’ (MNS). Many of
these studies in humans have reported mirror neuron activity
in areas assumed to be homologous to those where single cell
recordings have identified mirror neurons in monkeys
(Filimon, Nelson, & Hagler, 2007; Hamilton & Grafton,
2006; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Pobric & Hamilton,
2006; Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).
Whilst the discovery of mirror neurons has been a catalyst for
much research investigating the neural basis of goal-directed
action perception and understanding, a lively debate has emerged
concerning the extent to which mirror neurons underlie in these
processes. Classic theories concerning mirror neurons have
asserted that they represent an evolutionary specialisation for
understanding others’ goal-directed actions, via direct access to
representations that code for the performance of the same actions
(Aglioti, Cesar, Romani & Urgesi, 2008; Calvo-Merino, Glaser,
Grezes, Passingham,&Haggard, 2005; Keysers&Perrett, 2004;
Uddin et al., 2007). Specifically, it has been argued that mirror
neurons enable action understanding by directly matching
observed motor representations with those for performance of
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the same action, a position known as the direct matching hypoth-
esis (Gallese, 2007). The action understanding afforded by this
mechanism is thought to have a role in social processes such as
empathy, theory of mind, language, and social attention (Gallese,
2008; Iacoboni, 2009;Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett,
2001). However, these theories have been criticised on both
empirical and theoretical grounds.
Collecting direct evidence for mirror neurons in humans
has not been possible (for obvious ethical reasons), with one
important exemption (Mukamel et al., 2010). Guided by clin-
ical rather than empirical necessity, this study recorded corti-
cal areas (including frontal eye fields; FEF) that were not
identical to those previously identified in the macaque, and
thus even these findings are problematic for extrapolating pri-
mate MNS localisation to humans. Further, whilst the ma-
caque areas F5 and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) have been
shown to contain mirror neurons, they do not represent the
majority of cells in these areas (an average of 30% of neurons
in F5 and 20% in IPL; Kilner & Lemon, 2013). It is therefore
far from certain that activity in homologous areas in humans
(i.e., IPL and inferior frontal gyrus; IFG) necessarily represent
mirror neuron activity, without a more precise single cell
physiology of these human regions.
Indeed, fMRI data support the view that areas thought to be
part of the human MNS, and homologous to macaque mirror
neuron areas, are not specialised for action understanding but
are linked to a range of processes (e.g., the processing of
emotion, language, and number; Chochon, Cohen, Van De
Moortele, & Dehaene, 1999; Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le
Bihan, & Dehaene, 2002). Even if neurophysiological data
from human MNS areas represents the activity of single cell
mirror neurons, fMRI data have not always supported the
view that areas associated with the human MNS are recruited
during the performance and observation for the same action.
For example, Lingnau, Gesierich, & Caramazza (2009) did
not find evidence of fMRI adaptation, in human MNS areas,
for actions that were first performed and then subsequently
observed (see also Dinstein, Hasson, Rubin, & Heeger, 2007).
In addition to the lack of empirical verification of human
mirror neurons, alternative theoretical perspectives have
questioned the interpretation accorded to early studies in ma-
caques. For example, it is difficult to explain how single cells
could respond to goal-directed actions, but not non-goal-
directed actions, without recruiting wider computational pro-
cesses, which would ‘make sense’ of the complexity of coding
for goals (Hickok, 2009; Kosonogov, 2012). Heyes (2010) has
questioned the evolutionary account of the MNS when
responding to the difficulty in aligning evidence from the hu-
man and monkey MNS, and to evidence that areas associated
with the MNS are also active in a range of social tasks. Heyes
argues that mirror neurons are a corollary of associative learn-
ing and sensorimotor experience which occur during social
interaction, rather than an evolved mechanism making these
interactions possible. Thus, while there is considerable evi-
dence that mirror neurons are associated with the observation
and performance of human actions, much of the evidence to
date indicates that they may be one component of a diverse
neural system for action understanding. In addition, the func-
tion of mirror neurons themselves may extend beyond merely
understanding goal-directed action to a number of diverse
processes in social cognition.
It is fair to say that little of the research concerning the
neural underpinning of action understanding and social cog-
nition has explicitly examined the question of orienting atten-
tion to manual or whole-body actions of others. Nonetheless,
many of the areas that have been implicated in social attention
have also been implicated in encoding manual action and
movement. A number of adjacent and highly connected areas
(e.g., the superior temporal sulcus: STS; temporoparietal junc-
tion: TPJ and IPL) have been consistently linked with both
action understanding and social attention (as well as higher
level social cognition). The right TPJ, at the intersection be-
tween inferior parietal cortex and the posterior temporal cor-
tex, has also been extensively linked with reorienting attention
for behavioural goals (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Devlin &
Poldrack, 2007; Posner, Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal 1984).
The boundaries of the TPJ include parts of the posterior
STS. As previously mentioned, the STS responds selectively
to whole-body orientation as well as gaze orientation (Keysers
& Perrett, 2004; Perrett et al., 1985). Perrett and colleagues
(1985) identified this region as part of a biological orientation
system. The neurons recorded in this area were most sensitive
to gaze direction but also activated in response to head and
whole-body orientation.
In the case of both gaze and actions, the STS is thought to
be particularly responsive to the intentionality of perceived
gaze or action, such that looking behaviours or manual move-
ments that appear to be directed towards a target by an agent
are associated with higher activation (Pelphrey, Morris, &
McCarthy, 2004; Pelphrey et al., 2003). This interpretation is
consistent with data showing that the STS is involved in
higher order social cognitive processes such as theory of mind
and recognition of intention and agency (Mar, Kelley,
Heatherton, & Macrae, 2007; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson,
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004; Saxe et al., 2004). Both sets of
findings suggest that the STS supports higher order processing
of gaze and action direction, rather than lower level visual
analysis (Lee, Gao, & McCarthy, 2014; Schultz, Imamizu,
Kawato, & Frith 2004).
The anatomical coverage of the TPJ also converges with
the inferior parietal lobule (IPL). The IPL has also been linked
specifically with orienting attention to averted gaze (Sato,
Kochiyama, Uono, & Toichi, 2016). Further, it is considered
part of the MNS, and neurons here have been shown to rep-
resent both observed and performed goal-directed action, in
addition to areas within the ventral premotor cortex (Chong,
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Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher & Mattingley, 2008;
Fogassi et al., 2005). It has been reported that these areas are
also specifically sensitive to movements embedded in com-
plementary action goals and demonstrate different responses
when the same movements are observed pursuing different
goals. These cells have therefore also been thought to code
for intentionality in goal-directed action. A number of studies
have suggested that the IPL is a critical area for orienting
attention following observed gaze (e.g., Driver &
Mattingley, 1998; Vallar, 1993); however, this has been dis-
puted, with conflicting work having argued that the parietal
centre of the attention network is instead located in the supe-
rior parietal lobule (Gitelman et al., 1999). In addition to its
observed association with attention to averted gaze, the IPS (as
part of the MNS) may also have a role in attention shifts follow-
ing observed action. It is activated during the planning, execu-
tion, and perception of manual action (Frey, Vinton, Norlund &
Grafton, 2005; Grezes & Decety, 2001). In addition, activation
in this area is modulated by observed action goals (Hamilton &
Grafton, 2006).
Whilst the promise of functional overlap between social at-
tention and action understanding mechanisms is an interesting
direction for future research, few if any studies have probed the
role of these areas specifically for orienting attention to goal-
directed action. What is clear is that areas that have been associ-
ated with attending to gaze direction and symbolic stimuli (e.g.,
arrows) overlap extensivelywith thosewhich code for intentional
biological motion and manual action, including the STS, IPL,
IPS, and TPJ (Frischen et al. 2007; Hooker et al., 2003;
Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009). Indeed, a number of neural re-
gions that have been associated with processing gaze direction
and the intentional nature of eye gaze behaviours have been
linked to coding the direction of intentional manual actions.
Nonetheless, there are at present no studies probing the overlap-
ping or divergent activation of attentional networks following the
observation of eye gaze and symbolic cues (e.g., Callejas,
Shulman, & Corbetta, 2014) versus manual action cues, making
this an interesting but unexplored area for future research.
Research at the neurophysiological level has now begun to
probe whether gaze cueing may arise due to imitation or
mirroring of another’s eye movements. This work has re-
vealed that, despite evidence for neural regions specialized
for gaze processing, there has so far been little support for
‘eye movement cells’ with mirror properties. Recently, some
support has emerged for the presence of mirror neurons in
areas that control saccadic activity and overt attention such
as the lateral intraparietal area (LIP; Shepherd, Klein,
Deaner, & Platt, 2009), and the supplementary motor area
including the supplementary eye fields (Mukamel et al.,
2010). However, no evidence yet exists for neurons with mir-
ror properties in areas that are specifically linked with eye
movements such as the frontal eye fields. Additionally, only
Shepherd et al. (2009) recorded mirror properties of cells
specifically for observed and performed eye-movement be-
haviours. In contrast, mirror neurons which activate during
the performance and observation of actions have been found
throughout the premotor cortex (PMC), which is primarily
responsible for planning a range of manual actions (Calvo-
Merino et al., 2005; Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, & Fogassi,
2003; Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2005).
Just as behavioural studies find little support for the gaze
imitation hypothesis, it appears that shared representations for
the performance and observation of an oculomotor movement
lack a corresponding neural signature, in contrast to those for
manual movements. Certainly further work is required to es-
tablish the case for mirror neurons in areas responsible for the
control of attention and eye movements. The suggestion that
processing eye-gaze direction and wider social orienting
mechanisms could occur via mirroring or direct mapping pro-
cesses has, however, attracted growing interest (Frischen,
Loach, & Tipper, 2009; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010;
Shepherd, 2010). One recent fMRI study has already identi-
fied mirror neuron areas which may be responsive to averted
and direct gaze in humans (Coudé et al., 2016).
Nonetheless, there are problems with linking mirror
areas and social attention processes, even in the case of
observed actions. One reason for this is that the PMC is
not an area traditionally associated with endogenous or
exogenous attentional orienting networks (Corbetta &
Shulman, 2002; Rombough et al., 2012). In fact, neither
areas that are uniquely associated with social orienting to
gaze and head direction, nor more general circuits for
endogenous and exogenous orienting, have been identi-
fied as involving PMC. Thus there is little neural basis
for the involvement of this area of the MNS in orienting
to action. Moreover, the PMC is generally thought to re-
ceive input both from the STS and IPS, suggesting that
orienting and attention to movements might be processes
that occur prior to the direct mapping mechanisms that are
associated with PMC (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).
Thus, it may be that attention to biological movements,
such as gaze and action, is a functional prerequisite to the
direct mapping of representations, rather than a conse-
quence of them (Thompson & Parasuraman, 2012).
Overt attention to action
Most of the systematic work concerning attention to the ac-
tions of others has employed measures of eye movements
while participants observe goal-directed action. These para-
digms have revealed that overt attention behaviours diverge
when observing human manual actions versus mechanical or
physical movements that share the same spatial or directional
properties. Eye-movement paradigms have therefore revealed
strong evidence that overt attention may have specialised,
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domain-specific mechanisms for responding to observed ac-
tions and, moreover, these mechanisms may also be influ-
enced by the observer’s own current and future action plans.
Overt attention and action prediction
When individuals act alone in everyday tasks, predictive eye
movements are important for the control and planning of man-
ual actions. As such, a number of studies have shown that eye
movements anticipate the goals of our own planned actions
(Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Land & Hayhoe, 2001; Land,
Mennie, & Rusted, 1999; Land & Tatler, 2009). Flanagan
and Johansson (2003) also found that overt attention predicts
not just the goal of your own actions but also those of others.
Crucially, non-actor-propelled movement (e.g., a mechanical
claw or projected object) along the same trajectory of motion
does not elicit the same behaviour, even when it achieves the
same goal. This pattern of performance can also be seen in
preverbal infants, with spontaneous and proactive prediction
generally increasing with age (Ambrosini, Costantini, &
Sinigaglia, 2011; Ambrosini et al., 2013; Daum, Attig,
Gunawan, Prinz, & Gredeback, 2012; Rosander & von
Hofsten, 2011). Crucially, even whenmultiple potential action
goals are present, predictive eye movements have been shown
to rapidly and accurately reflect the goal of an observed action
(Rotman, Troje, Johansson, & Flanagan, 2006)
The direct matching hypothesis and attention to action
Evidence suggesting a close relationship between predicative
eye movements in performed and observed actions has led to
the proposal that theMNSmaymediate these processes. In the
case of over attention, the direct matching hypothesis postu-
lates that the same predictive eye movements are represented
by the motor system for observed as well as performed goal-
directed actions. Direct matching has received considerable
support in the literature concerning predictive eyemovements.
Ambrosini et al. (2013) also found a relationship between
infants’ ability to perform grasping actions and the level of
predictive gaze behaviour during observation of the same
movements. A relationship between 12-month-old infant’s
predictive gaze and immediate prior experience of executing
reaching responses to objects has also been demonstrated
(Cannon, Woodward, Gredeback, von Hofsten, & Turek,
2012). Further, developmental perspectives have confirmed
that infants’motor experience determines the movements they
most accurately predict (Stapel, Hunnius, Meyer, &
Bekkering 2016).With adults, Ambrosini et al. (2011) showed
that predictive saccades were biased toward the object that
matched the size of the actor’s grip. In their study, participants
were more likely to saccade to the smaller of two objects when
the observed reach was a precision grip and the larger object
when a power grip was viewed. Costantini, Ambrosini, and
Sinigaglia (2012) found impairments to predictive gaze when
participants observed actions using a particular grasp that was
incompatible with the one they were asked to maintain while
resting during the experiment. Virtual lesions of the left ven-
tral premotor cortex were shown to modulate the predictive
gaze effect (Costantini, Ambrosini, Cardellicchio, &
Sinigaglia, 2013), as did actors who moved to a target that
was out of their reach (Costantini et al., 2012). When partic-
ipant’s hand movements were restricted, predictive gaze is
also impaired (Ambrosini et al., 2012).
A further feature of predictive gaze, which may support the
direct matching hypothesis, is that anticipatory eye move-
ments for action appear to be modulated by goal salience
(Henrichs, Elsner, Elsner, & Gredeback, 2012). Considerable
evidence from the mirror neuron literature in humans and
nonhuman primates indicates that MNS activation is sensitive
to the goal states of actions (Fogassi et al., 2005; Hamilton &
Grafton, 2006; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008; Van
Overwalle & Baetens, 2009).
Despite the wealth of evidence consistent with the direct
matching hypothesis, there have been some objections raised.
Most notably, Eshuis, Coventry, and Vulchanova (2009)
found that the presentation of end effects when viewing action
modulated predictive gaze and did not require a human actor
to be viewed. This position has been further supported by the
finding that in matched interactive contexts, predictive gaze to
human and robot action is strikingly similar (Sciutti et al.,
2012). As mirror neuron activation is generally thought to be
selectively responsive to human biological actions (Kilner,
Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003; Tai, Scherfler, Brooks,
Sawamoto, & Castiello, 2004), some authors suggest that pre-
dictive gaze is an example of a general goal-directed bias,
which guides overt attention to action (Csibra & Gergely,
2007). In support of this position, some authors have found
predictive eye movements can also be sensitive to the goals of
observed actions, which would not be available by simulating
the actions kinematics, including the relationship between an
object’s physical properties and its function (Hunnius &
Bekkering, 2010), or the efficacy with which an observed
action achieves a goal (Biro, 2013). This evidence indicates
predictive eye movements are sensitive to movement–goal
relationships that could not be explained solely by the pres-
ence of action performance processes during action
observation.
The presence of goal-directed inference across a range of
goal states during action observation may be explained by
developmental approaches which argue that correspondence
between observed and performed actions are the result of
learning and experience. The theory of associative sequence
learning (ASL; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Heyes, Bird,
Johnson, & Haggard, 2005) suggests that mirror representa-
tions of goal-directed actions are determined primarily by the
frequency with which infants and young children observe and
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perform complementary actions. Paulus et al. (2011) found
that infants’ looking behaviour prior to an observed action
was based on the frequency of what had previously been ob-
served. This approach may explain why predictive gaze is
modulated both by differences in the observed goal-state and
kinematics when actions are observed.
Regardless of the underlying mechanisms subserving the
predictive gaze phenomenon, there is now substantial evi-
dence in favour of an attentional mechanism that, if not unique
to the observation of human action, is attuned to the goal-
directed context within which these movements are common-
ly observed. Crucially, research on predictive gaze has re-
vealed that attention may select and orient to actions in a
specialised way, when compared to equivalent lower level
motion stimuli in the environment.
Covert attention to action
Action in covert cueing paradigms
Whilst there is now a substantial literature suggesting that eye
movements and head direction can shift covert attention,
much less is known about how actions direct covert shifts. A
small number of studies have specifically addressed howman-
ual gestures influence attention. Langton, O’Malley, and
Bruce (1996) and Langton and Bruce (2000) initially used a
Stroop-like (Stroop, 1935) paradigm to investigate whether
processing of irrelevant pointing gestures interfered with ver-
bal directional cues whenmaking judgments of direction. This
was shown to be the case, independently of head and eye-gaze
orientation. These initial results indicated that participants
were unable to ignore observed manual gestures when
attempting to complete a task based upon speech. Langton
and Bruce (2000) argued that like other directional social cues
(e.g., head and eye gaze), manual actions can elicit exogenous
visual orienting in the observer (Bruce & Langton, 1999;
Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). The authors
suggested that manual gesture direction may provide an
orienting cue that is equally, or perhaps more salient, than
other social cues such as eye gaze. This interpretation is con-
sistent with studies showing that directional biological cues
elicit reflexive cueing effects similar to those of eye gaze and
head direction (Ariga & Watanabe, 2009; Watanabe, 2002).
Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude whether the pointing
gestures used in these studies generalize to other kinds of
manual or goal-directed actions. Such pointing cues may act
like other directional, symbolic stimuli that are known to re-
flexively orient attention, such as arrows (Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998; Ristic et al., 2002; Tipples, 2002, 2008).
These studies therefore do not determine whether pointing
actions produce specialized attentional affects, as a result of
being social and biological (like eye gaze), or influence
attention in a more general, symbolic manner. In support of
this distinction, some body postures alone, such as trunk ori-
entation, do not cue attention (Hietanen, 2002). On the other
hand, there is some evidence that biological motion, like both
gaze and manual actions, may shift attention automatically.
Using point-light displays of moving walkers, it has been
shown that both human and nonhuman (e.g., a cat) biological
motion can cue attention in a congruent direction, even when
this is a counterpredictive cue to subsequent targets.
Moreover, this effect disappears both with inverted motion
orientation and nonbiological motion stimuli (Shi, Weng,
He, & Jiang, 2010). These results indicate that reflexive atten-
tion may be specialized for biological motion direction.
Additionally, Gervais, Reed, Beall, and Roberts (2010) di-
rectly investigated the cueing effects of noncommunicative
manual actions. They utilized a nonpredictive cueing para-
digm to determine whether running and throwing cues would
orient attention to peripheral targets. Their results showed that
both of these cues do indeed orient attention, additionally
replicating the finding that trunk orientation alone does not
elicit a cueing effect. Their results also yielded two other in-
teresting findings. First, the SOA between cue and target was
tested at 100 ms, 300 ms, and 600 ms. It was found that throw
cues, but not run cues, shifted attention at the shortest SOA of
100 ms. This short SOA is like that observed with reflexive
attention shifts following central gaze and arrow cues, as well
as peripheral transient cues (Kingstone, Smilek, Ristic,
Friesen, & Eastwood, 2003; Posner & Cohen, 1984).
Perhaps more uniquely, Gervais et al. found faster responses
for throw and run cues across both cued and uncued targets
compared to nonacting cues. This matches the finding in the
gaze-cueing literature that gaze cues elicit shorter RTs across
both cued and uncued locations compared to arrows
(Quadflieg et al., 2004). These two findings (Gervais et al.,
2010; Quadflieg et al., 2004) suggest that biological move-
ment primes response readiness in the case of both gaze and
action cues. This manual priming effect occurred following
the throwing gestures, and to a lesser extent the running ac-
tions, compared to nonactors and nonhuman directional cues.
Manual actions may be perceived from the observer’s own
egocentric viewpoint (where, for example, an actor might face
away from the observer). Alternatively, and perhaps more
commonly during social interaction, they may be viewed
allocentrically, like gaze where an actor may face the
observer. One question for research on attentional orienting
by action is whether this perspective is important for the
effects of joint action on attention. Belopolsky, Olivers, and
Theeuwes (2008) investigated this with a cueing paradigm in
which a group of participants either saw manual pointing ges-
tures allocentrically or egocentrically, which were either spa-
tially compatible or incompatible with targets. This allowed
the authors to examine whether perspective would influence
the validity of cues and additionally, whether validity
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interacted with anatomical compatibility. The authors found
that the validity effect for responding to cued locations did not
interact with whether the actions were allocentric or egocen-
tric, or with the anatomical compatibility of the observed
movement. These results suggest that the effect of such ges-
tures on attention is independent of direct mapping mecha-
nisms that are known to drive compatibility effects between
action observation and performance.
The interpretation of Belopolsky et al.’s (2008) paradigm is
problematic, however. Despite being more ecologically valid,
the pointing stimuli used are difficult to compare to the float-
ing, isolated directional cues typically used in Posner cueing
paradigms. In particular, pointing gestures are likely to be
attended not just centrally but peripherally, and therefore
may be attended exogenously due to low-level sensory input,
rather than endogenously. This may explain the persistence of
cueing effects across changes in perspective, which are known
to modulate direct mapping mechanisms (e.g., Alaerts,
Heremans, Swinnen, &Wenderoth, 2009). In addition, partic-
ipants always performed the same right-handed finger press
movement, so it is not known whether movement compatibil-
ity may have influenced the cueing effects.
Fischer, Prinz, and Lotz (2008) presented stronger evidence
that covert attention may be oriented by the direct mapping of
performed action mechanisms. They presented participants
with a central grasping gesture that was congruent with one
of two differently sized objects, due to the grasp’s aperture.
The authors found that when a subsequent target appeared at
the location where the object was congruent with the grasp,
participants were faster to detect its onset, an effect that was
present at an SOA of as little as 250–300 ms (between grasp-
ing cue presentation and target onset). A second experiment
replicated these findings with counterpredictive cues, estab-
lishing that grasp-based attentional orienting was reflexive.
Additional evidence in favour of direct mapping has paralleled
that of predictive gaze paradigms. Using a slightly modified
procedure, Lindemann, Nuku, Rueschemeyer, and Bekkering
(2011) found that this effect was sensitive to the animacy of
the perceived grasp aperture. The authors again interpret these
results in the context of direct mapping, suggesting that covert
attention shifts following observed actions are due to the sim-
ulation of similar attentional mechanisms required for the per-
formance of a congruent action.
Social inhibition of return
In addition to studies where participants take part alone, atten-
tion to action has also been investigated when two or more
people undertake a cueing task simultaneously. These para-
digms modified those that investigated attentional processes,
when participants performed goal-directed reaching move-
ments in isolation (Tremblay, Welsh, & Elliott, 2005; Welsh
& Elliott, 2004; Welsh & Pratt, 2006). This includes a target–
target aiming task, where single participants are found to ex-
hibit inhibition in the second of two RTs to the same target
location. These results are typically interpreted in terms of
IOR. Attention is returned to the same (now inhibited) loca-
tion in the second response, as it had previously been located
during the first response. The presence of IOR implies that the
execution of the participant’s first response induces a reflexive
shift of attention to the location of aiming, much like low-level
transient cues do in the traditional Posner cueing paradigm.
The second of their aiming responses is then inhibited when
attention and/or motor processes are directed to the same
target.
In the joint action paradigm used by Welsh et al. (2005),
pairs of participants take turns to reach to locations on a shared
work surface. Each participant’s trial consists of two target
presentations that can appear at random, either to the left or
right of a central fixation. This allows the analysis of each
participant’s RT to initiate a response following their own
previous response, and following the response of the other
coacting participant. In the case of a participant following their
own last action, Welsh et al. replicated previous work (e.g.,
Tremblay et al., 2005; Welsh & Pratt, 2006) showing that
participant’s RTs were slower in the case where the same
location was reached to, verses a different location. Of partic-
ular interest, however, was the finding that a participant’s re-
sponse to the same location as that of their coactor’s previous
response was also slowed. This novel finding was interpreted
as an example of IOR elicited by the actions of another.
The presence of IOR was striking in this context as this
phenomenon had not been demonstrated following an action
cue, and only two studies have done so in response to gaze
cues (Frischen, Smilek, et al., 2007; Frischen & Tipper, 2004).
Of these, it was determined that long cue-target intervals were
required, alongside a centrally presented perceptual transient
such as the gaze cue offset or an independent transient event
(see Orienting to Social Cues: The Case of Gaze section).
Given the robust finding that IOR occurs in the second of
two subsequent goal-directed aiming movements (Tremblay
et al., 2005; Welsh & Pratt, 2006), Welsh et al. suggested that
observed aiming movements may elicit inhibitory mecha-
nisms due to shared representations between observed and
performed actions.
The transfer of inhibitory processes from one individual to
another following goal-directed actions may be an example of
action corepresentation. Corepresentation during joint action
is defined as the shared representation of each other’s action
and/or goal across two or more individuals. In these contexts,
an actor represents not just their own action plans during a
shared activity but also those of their partner. Corepresentation
between actors can be supported by direct perceptual-motor
experience of another’s actions, by communicative behav-
iours, or by inference and prediction of another’s actions
based upon knowledge of the goals of their activity or goal-
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relevant stimuli (see Knoblich, Butterfill, & Sebanz, 2011;
Vesper et al., 2016, for reviews).
Neural substrates of corepresentation are thought to in-
volve a number of regions and networks, many of which have
also been associated with other kinds of social cognition.
Studies have identified higher activation in areas thought to
be part of the humanMNSwhen corepresentation of another’s
action occurs within a joint task, including the IPL (Wen &
Hsiah, 2015). Activation in the IPL is consistent with the
MNS having a role in joint action, linking observed actions
with their own performance (Molenberghs et al., 2009), as
well as making discriminations between self and other origi-
nated actions (e.g. Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, &
Iacoboni, 2006). Corepresentation has also been associated
with areas integral to making inferences about others’ inten-
tions, including the medial PFC and STS (Chaminade,
Marchant, Kilner, & Frith 2012; Liepelt et al., 2016).
Finally, activation has been observed in areas which have been
implicated in, and the discrimination of, self and other-related
representations and agency, including TPJ (Bardi, Gheza &
Brass, 2016; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009). Taken
together, these findings indicate corepresentation is subserved
by sensorimotor control and mirroring of another’s action, as
well as inferences about another’s intentions and the control of
self and other- related representations.
The interpretation of Welsh et al. (2005) in terms of an
‘action corepresentation account’ was supported by the fact
that there was no difference found in the magnitude of IOR in
their findings between trials following participants’ own re-
sponses and trials following those of their coactor. Thus, the
effect may reflect the automatic shifts of attention and subse-
quent inhibition that are known to precede the planning of
goal-directed action (Baldauf, Wolf, & Deubel, 2006) rather
than the less reflexive mechanisms provoked by centrally pre-
sented gaze, arrow, and action cues. A number of further stud-
ies using this joint IOR paradigm have sought a fuller under-
standing of this action-based attentional mechanism. Cole,
Skarratt, and Billing (2012) suggested that social IOR could
be due to sensory transients, occurring when a coactor’s tar-
gets are presented at peripheral locations and therefore induc-
ing the ‘standard’ IOR effect. This ‘attentional cueing’ ac-
count posits no role for action corepresentation. Welsh et al.
(2005) used LCD goggles to occlude the presentation of a
coactor’s targets from the participant. They found that ‘be-
tween-person’ IOR was present when no target presentation
was visible, suggesting that another’s action was wholly re-
sponsible for eliciting the effect.
In a follow-up study, Welsh et al. (2007) again used LCD
goggles to determine which components of observed action
might subserve inhibition. They found that either the observed
culmination or initiation of action were sufficient, to cause
IOR. The latter finding in particular, ruled out a similar but
subtler objection to Welsh et al.’s (2005) original result: that
the culmination of another’s reaching response was an exog-
enous sensory event that caused within-person IOR, with
properties equivalent to a peripheral cue. On the contrary, a
centrally observed reach was sufficient to inhibit subsequent
responses. This finding appears to be inconsistent with the
gaze cueing literature, which reports no IOR at the SOAs
typically used in this study, following centrally presented cues
(Frischen, Smilek, et al., 2007; Frischen & Tipper, 2004), and
therefore with an attentional cueing account of the effect.
Welsh et al. (2007) also found a significant correlation be-
tween within- and between-person inhibition, which
underscored the potentially shared mechanism between these
two behaviours.
The importance of controlling for low-level stimuli in the
joint IOR paradigm, as demonstrated by Welsh et al. (2007),
was shown in two further sets of experiments. In the first,
Welsh, Ray, Weeks, Dewey, and Elliott (2009) investigated
social IOR in populations with autistic spectrum disorder
(ASD). ASD is characterized by a triad of deficits in social
communication, social interaction, as well as a propensity to-
wards repetitive behaviour patterns (Baron-Cohen & Bolton,
1994). Importantly, groups of ASD participants have also
demonstrated atypical behaviours in measures of social atten-
tion such as reduced gaze cueing, yet the same dissociations
do not occur for orienting to low-level visual stimuli typically
presented in Posner cueing paradigms (Goldberg et al., 2008;
Johnson et al., 2005; Marotta et al., 2012; Rinehart, Bradshaw,
Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 2008; Ristic et al., 2005). Welsh
et al. found this pattern was present in the social IOR para-
digm, where a high functioning ASD group was compared
with typically developing (TD) controls. Under ‘full’ visual
conditions, where no portion of the partner’s action was oc-
cluded, nor the presentation of their target, an IOR effect was
evidenced in both groups. However, when LCD goggles were
employed to restrict the culmination of actions in peripheral
vision, and leaving only a central window of visibility, IOR
was only present in the TD group.
Testing a TD sample of adults, a further dissociation was
revealed by Skarratt, Cole, and Kingstone (2010). They also
restricted the visual access to coactor’s responses in peripheral
vision using a set of physical barriers, such that again there
was only a central window of visibility. Under these condi-
tions, and over two experiments, the authors established that
although an animated partner’s behaviour does not elicit IOR,
the behaviour of a real coactor does. Taken in conjunction
with the findings of Welsh, Ray, et al. (2009), these findings
suggest that when visual transients are restricted, the effect is
sensitive to manipulations of social or interactive context, as
well as being dissociable in populations with atypically devel-
oping traits in social interaction. This has led to the term social
IOR being applied to the between-person IOR effect (Skarratt,
Cole, & Kuhn, 2012), implying an IOR effect that is necessi-
tated by some level of social interaction.
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Action corepresentation and attention in social IOR
Demonstrations that orienting to action in social IOR para-
digms can be affected by social interactions suggests that, in
the absence of peripheral transient cues typically needed to
generate IOR, the effect may be generated by an independent
mechanism. As Welsh et al. (2005; Welsh et al., 2007; Welsh,
Ray, et al., 2009) argued, IOR following another’s action may
be related to similar exogenous attention shifts that typically
precede goal-directed action. As a result, the authors suggest
that inhibition may arise following another’s observed action
due to the corepresentation of observed and performed action.
Like other direct mapping approaches of attention to action,
this position posits that the same mechanisms that control
orienting prior to and during the performance of goal-
directed action are also evoked during the observation of the
same action. In further accordance with direct mapping ap-
proaches, Welsh et al. suggest that the MNS may be respon-
sible for the corepresentation of observed and performed
actions.
That social IOR should result from the corepresentation of
another’s actions may shed light on why the inhibition is ob-
served under the restricted visual conditions employed by
Welsh et al. (2007; Welsh, Ray, et al., 2009) and Skarratt
et al. (2010), even when this is inconsistent with stimuli that
are typically thought to cause this effect. The role of
corepresentation and the MNS in social IOR has received
additional support from two sources. First, Hayes, Hansen,
and Elliott (2010) found that for both between- (social) and
within-person IOR, the salience of low-level stimulus and
response events were approximately equivalent, suggesting
shared inhibitory mechanisms following previous actions in
both.
Second, Welsh, McDougall, and Weeks (2009) tested par-
ticipants sitting side-by-side, rather than opposite each other,
making responses to a shared touchscreen. In a typical social
IOR paradigm, when participants respond to the same loca-
tion, theymake a different kinematic movement. For example,
if Coactor A responds to a target on their right side, they must
make a simple elbow extension movement. However, if
Coactor B then responds to the same target location as
Coactor A (their left hand side), a cross-body movement must
be made. Using the side-by-side arrangement, Welsh,
McDougall, et al. (2009) were able to dissociate within-
person from between-person IOR processes. They dissociated
when participants responded to the same location, using dif-
ferent movements, from when participants made the same
movement, but to a different location. The two conditions
were compared to baseline trials, where neither the movement
nor response location were the same as the previous response.
The authors demonstrated that both same location/different
movement and same movement/different location trials were
delayed when compared to baseline on between- and within-
person trials. Moreover, the authors established that delay
magnitude in between-person trials was again related to
within-person performance for both trial types. These data
suggest shared mechanisms in the observation and perfor-
mance of goal-directed aiming.
Recent data have extended these findings beyond RT mea-
sures (Cole, Wright, Doneva, & Skarratt, 2015). In the case of
an individual Posner-type free-choice task, where participants
are presented with a cue followed by the request to select a
response location at either the cued or uncued location, they
are less likely to respond at the area previously cued (Wilson
& Pratt, 2007). Cole et al. found that this behaviour extended
to the joint goal-directed aiming paradigm used in social IOR.
This again indicates that cognitive processes associated with
planning individual aiming movements may be elicited by
observing the same movements. Interestingly, the presence
of inhibition under these conditions indicates that IOR and
social IOR are due to attentional mechanisms, rather than a
potentially competing account—that participants are commit-
ting the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ (Croson & Sundali, 2005). The
gambler’s fallacy is the belief that repeated independent
events are less likely than probability theory actually predicts.
Humans are generally poor at generating truly random num-
bers or sequences (e.g., Bakan, 1960; Wagenaar, 1972) and
will evidence a bias away from repeated digits in such se-
quences. This behaviour may manifest in response time by
reduced preparedness to make a response to repeatedly pre-
sented targets. Nonetheless, Lyons, Weeks, and Elliott (2013)
demonstrated that there was a relationship between IOR and
the tendency to bet against repeated digits in a joint task—
presenting interesting evidence that there may be a basic rela-
tionship between these two inhibitory processes. Understanding
the direction of this relationship is a fruitful area of future atten-
tion and decision-making research.
Corepresentation and attention during joint action
Frischen et al. (2009) adopted a similar selective reaching
procedure to that of Welsh et al. (2005) to investigate atten-
tional processes during joint action. They asked participants to
take part jointly in a negative priming task. Negative priming
paradigms (S. P. Tipper 1985; see S. P. Tipper, 2001, for a
review) are thought to reveal attentional mechanisms where
processing of goal-relevant stimuli is facilitated whist irrele-
vant distracting stimuli are simultaneously inhibited. Negative
priming tasks typically find that target objects that were to-be-
ignored distractors up to a few seconds prior are inhibited
more strongly than previously neutral objects. The more sa-
lient and behaviourally relevant the previous distractor stimuli
are, the stronger the subsequent inhibition observed. In nega-
tive priming tasks, where goal-directed reaching responses are
performed, inhibition is action-centred, rather than
visuospatially organized (MacDonald, Joordens, & Seergobin,
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1999). This is indicated by the robust finding that distractors
located close to the initiation point of the reaching hand elicit
the strongest negative priming effect.
Frischen et al. 2009 adapted a reach-response negative
priming paradigm for two participants who took turns in mak-
ing responses to targets, in the presence of distractors. In the
individual condition, they made two consecutive responses,
with probe trials measuring response time to locations relative
to previous target and distractor locations in prime trials. In the
dual person condition, the prime trial was performed by the
experimenter and participants then made one subsequent re-
sponse. Results replicated the finding that distractors located
close to the responding hand were inhibited most strongly in
the individual condition. However, in the dual person condi-
tion, the position of strongest inhibition shifted to those
distractors located close to the hand of the experimenter.
Further evidence that attentional effects pertaining to the po-
sition of the hand can transfer to that of another person was
presented by Sun and Thomas (2013). They expanded the
finding of Abrams, Davoli, Du, Knapp (2008), and Paull
(2008), who found visual stimuli which were presented close
to the hand induced faster shifts of attention. Sun and Thomas
found this effect occurred when the hand of another was
placed close to targets; however, this was only after the par-
ticipants had taken part in a joint-action task.
These results suggest that witnessing the actions of another
person modulates mechanisms of selective attention.
Specifically, Frischen et al. (2009) interpret these findings as
evidence that participants simulate the action-centred atten-
tional mechanisms of another during joint action. As such,
their findings represent compelling evidence that the same
covert attention processes, that are employed in the perfor-
mance of a goal directed action are also elicited during the
observation of the same action. In further support of this
claim, the authors employed a control condition that sought
to rule out attentional cueing due to sensory capture by the
motion of the action itself.
However, controlling for sensory transients (i.e., Welsh
et al., 2007) does not necessarily refute an attentional cueing
account of effects like social IOR. The (seen) initial part of a
coactor’s response may be enough to shift an observer’s atten-
tion. In support of this view, Atkinson, Simpson, Skarratt, and
Cole (2014) found that centrally viewed pointing responses
generated social IOR when peripheral events were obscured.
This supports a similar finding by Skarratt et al. (2010), who
observed the effect following only centrally presented eye/
head cues. Atkinson et al. (2014) demonstrated that even
when participants observed a different action to that which
they performed, social IOR was present. Doneva & Cole
(2014) and Doneva, Atkinson, Skarratt & Cole (2017) ob-
served that peripheral transients, generated by luminance
changes, were sufficient to generate the effect in the absence
of a coactor. Moreover, they showed that responses made with
a different effector (feet, as opposed to hands) did not alter the
basic effect. These findings cast doubt upon a corepresentation
account of inhibition. Whilst IOR is not typically observed
following head, gaze, and manual cues in individual cueing
paradigms, evidence from joint-action procedures suggests
that within an interactive context (i.e., when taking turns to
respond), these social cues may be the equivalent of low-level
sensory transients, and so generate the subsequent inhibitory
effects. Further work has shown that participants’ belief that an
observed action is made to a specific location is not sufficient
to generate social IOR. Welsh, Manzone, and McDougall
(2014) found that an auditory cue which featured no spatial
dimension failed to induce social IOR, indicating that some
direct visual input is necessary for the effect. This study shows
that whether the effect is due to corepresentation or attentional
cueing, some direct visual signal of action, head or gazemove-
ment is required.
Action goals and attention
If observed and performed actions are corepresented and co-
vert attention makes use of these corepresentations, then this
attentional process may be sensitive to the goals of observed
actors. This perspective is consistent with an array of studies
in the literature on action observation, which suggest that
these corepresentations are based on the goals of actions
(e.g., Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Central to this asser-
tion is the view that the goal of an action can be inferred from
bodily movement (Becchio, Manera, Sartori, Cavallo, &
Castiello, 2012), and that these goals are the principal infor-
mation encoded during action corepresentation (Fogassi et al.,
2005; Gazzola et al., 2007).
A number of studies have now shown that action planning
and internally generated movement goals can influence atten-
tion and perception. Specifically, according to the theory of
event coding (TEC; Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2001), stimuli pertaining to action effects can be selec-
tively processed over competing stimuli, when particular ac-
tion plans are relevant (e.g., Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz,
2007; Wykowska, Hommel, & Schubö, 2012). For example,
when reach movements are to be performed, selection is bi-
ased to location-related stimuli, whereas for grasping move-
ments, size-related stimuli are processed preferentially.
Interestingly these effects are also observed when reach or
grasping action is observed in another (Fagioli et al., 2007)
and responses were made using the foot (no reaching or grasp-
ing responses were performed). These findings suggest that
selection for action effects occurs following observed as well
as performed action. TEC interprets these findings as evidence
that actions are prepared according to their perceptual conse-
quences rather than to motor plans. Therefore, the framework
argues that stimulus and response representations are coded
within the same space so that preparing or observing goal-
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directed actions activates the relevant stimulus codes for the
goals of that action. TEC therefore presents a single frame-
work for interpreting the finding that observed and performed
action both bias attention to stimuli codes based upon the
goals of the action (e.g., Hommel, 2010).
In the case of attention during joint action, the evidence
regarding whether orienting to another’s action is modulated
by goals is unclear. Using the social IOR paradigm, Cole et al.
(2012) carried out a series of experiments to determine wheth-
er differences in the goal state of identically performed actions
modulates social IOR. None of the experiments found that
differences in observed and performed goal, between partici-
pant pairs, modulated the size of social IOR observed.
Interestingly, in the most ecologically valid experiment, where
pairs performed different goal-directed actions (e.g., writing
or erasing a character on paper), participants were faster to
execute an action when the same goal was performed.
Nonetheless, this RT benefit did not interact with the social
IOR effect. These results suggest that the encoding action
goals, which has received much support in the literature,
may be independent of the ability of the same actions to shift
attention. This position has similarly found support from
Janczyk, Welsh, and Dolk (2015), who observed that manip-
ulations of action goals did not influence the social IOR effect.
In addition, these findings indicate that the mechanisms
eliciting shifts of attention to action may not be based on
corepresentation of observed and performed action at all (as
observed action representation is typically shown to be sensi-
tive to the goal state of the encoded actions).
Nonetheless, recent work has provided evidence that the
goals of actions may modulate shifts of attention (Ondobaka,
de Lange, Newman-Norlund, Wiemers, & Bekkering, 2012).
This study employed a variant of the basic social IOR proce-
dure, where participants took turns to make reaching re-
sponses to sets of cards located on the left and right of a flat
touchscreen. Using a confederate coactor, the authors manip-
ulated responses to the higher or lower of two cards, and
participants were asked to monitor the goal of the coactor
and to adopt the same goal or a different goal (i.e., match their
move to the higher or lower cards or make the opposite re-
sponse). Results showed that this manipulation affected RTs.
Like Cole et al. (2012), movements across both previously
responded locations and opposite locations were faster when
participants had the same goal. However, in Ondobaka et al.’s
task, the differences in action goal appeared to modulate de-
layed movements to the same location, such that the social
IOR effect was abolished when participants had different
goals.
In view of these conflicting findings, the role of goals in
attending to other’s action is unresolved. Differences in the
methods of the two studies (Cole et al., 2012; Ondobaka
et al., 2012) may indicate why their findings differed. For
example, in Ondobaka et al. (2012), participants had to infer
action goals online, on a trial-by-trial basis, whereas in Cole
et al. (2012) the goal states of participants were blocked.
Critically, participants in Cole et al.’s task did not have to
update the goal state of the other participant in order to per-
form their own response, so action planning was not depen-
dent upon the other’s goal, merely their own. This, however,
was systematically examined by Cole, Atkinson, D’Souza,
Welsh and Skarratt (in press), whose results suggested that
task relevancy of the coactors’ actions may not be an impor-
tant component. Furthermore, Cole et al. failed to replicate the
original findings of Ondobaka et al.
Attending to action in interactive contexts
If the critical factor, which determines attention to another’s
action, is the task relevance to the observer of that action, then
a key question (when studying joint action) is how interactive
social context effects attention. Whilst Skarratt et al. (2010)
probed this issue by comparing performance of participants
when they undertook the task with a live coactor verses an
animated one, little other work has addressed how character-
istics of joint tasks influence attention to another’s action.
Nonetheless, other work in the joint action and social attention
literature indicates that live interactive contexts may be essen-
tial for a full understanding of how social cues are processed
during visual cognition.
In the social attention literature, there is now some evi-
dence that the degree to which experimental stimuli approxi-
mate a face-to-face, social interaction can affect social atten-
tion. In the case of the gaze-cueing effect, the role of more
complex dynamic stimuli is subtle. In infants, motion appears
to be necessary for gaze orienting (Farroni, Johnson,
Brockbank, & Simion, 2000). Nonetheless, neither photo-
graphic faces nor dynamic movement in gaze cues have been
shown to increase themagnitude of the gaze cueing effect with
adults (Hietanen & Leppänen, 2003). Recent work has even
revealed that gaze cueing in a live face-to-face situation elicits
an effect comparable in magnitude to schematic eye gaze
stimuli (Cole, Smith, & Atkinson, 2015; Lachat, Conty,
Hugueville, & George, 2012). Interestingly, however, some
evidence suggests that social manipulations of the gaze-
cueing effect may be most powerful under conditions where
gaze stimuli are dynamic and thus better approximates expe-
rience of gaze in the environment. In particular, modulation of
gaze cueing by emotion has been shown to occur only using
dynamic stimuli which present gaze motion (Putman,
Hermans, & Van Honk, 2006). Procedures which have shown
moderation of gaze cueing by mental state attribution have
employed dynamic cues such as videos and human rather than
schematic gaze cues (Teufel et al., 2010; Wiese et al., 2012).
Evidence from the gaze-cueing literature therefore indicates
that attention may be modulated by interactive factors when
stimuli are dynamic and approximate a human gazer.
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The importance of interactive context for attention to action
is further underlined by findings from the wider joint action
literature. Joint tasks such as that which produces the joint
Simon effect (JSE; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003) have
been found to be sensitive to the interactive context in which
they are performed. In a typical joint Simon task, participants
take part in a spatial compatibility task, where spatially orient-
ed responses (such as a button on the left or right) must be
made to stimuli on the basis of a nonspatial characteristic (e.g.,
red or green), which also possesses a spatial dimension (e.g.,
they are on the left or right of a display). When participants
perform this task alone, it is typically found that they are faster
to detect, for example, a red item when this is placed in a
congruent spatial location to the red response, relative to an
incongruent location (i.e., the Simon effect; Craft, Simon, &
Richard, 1970; J. Simon, 1970). When participants perform
this task with another person, such that each person is only
responsible for one response, a Simon effect also emerges.
This effect disappears however, when a single participant per-
forms only one of the two possible responses. This observa-
tion has led to considerable research interest. The individual
Simon effect is thought to emerge because spatially oriented
stimuli elicit automatic orientation of compatible response
codes (Hommel, Müsseler, et al., 2001; Kornblum,
Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). The JSE is therefore believed
to emerge from the corepresentation of another person’s re-
sponse codes as a result of engaging in joint action. These
corepresentations may be for another’s action, task or both
(however, see Dolk, Hommel, Prinz, & Liepelt, 2013;
Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2005).
Although the JSE is not yet fully understood, it is reason-
able to say that much of the subsequent empirical work has
revealed that the JSE can be modulated by subtle social ma-
nipulations. For example, a negative interpersonal relationship
between coactors can abolish the effect (Hommel, Colzato, &
van denWildenberg, 2009). When participants act alongside a
wooden nonhuman hand or believe a remote coactor to be a
preprogrammed computer, the effect is also abolished (Tsai &
Brass, 2007; Tsai, Kuo, Hung, & Tzeng, 2008). The effect
with the wooden coactor can, however be reinstated when
participants are primed as to the animacy or agency of the
coacting hand (Müller, Brass, et al., 2011). The effect is undi-
minished by the removal of visual and auditory online feed-
back of the coactor and their presence in interpersonal space
(Vlainic, Liepelt, Colzato, Prinz, & Hommel, 2010; Welsh
et al., 2013). Researchers have also tested whether social iden-
tity processes influence joint action using this paradigm.
Social identity theory argues that group memberships are
internalised, such that they become integral to an individual’s
self and sense of identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As a result
of social identity processes, individuals show increased prej-
udice toward and competition with those who are members of
outgroups (Brewer, 1979). Consistent with this approach,
interacting with another person from either a natural or mini-
mal lab-induced outgroup weakens the JSE (McClung,
Jentzsch, & Reicher, 2013; Müller, Kühn, et al., 2011).
These findings clearly have implications for the mech-
anisms that underlie orienting to action. If attention to
action, as evidenced in social IOR and the predictive gaze
paradigms, is subserved by the corepresentation or direct
mapping of observed actions, then this may well be mod-
ulated by interactive factors. Indeed, according to the
above findings, sharing a task with a coactor, the social
relationship between the observer and coactor and beliefs
regarding the animacy and intentionality of observed ac-
tion may all affect processes by which observed action
orients attention. All or any one of these factors may
account for the findings of Skarratt et al. (2010), who
found an animated partner did not elicit social IOR.
Interactive factors may also influence attentional effects,
such as predictive gaze and grasp cueing. As a live inter-
active paradigm, the social IOR studies offer a useful tool
to investigate social and contextual factors underlying at-
tention to action (and indeed other social cues, such as
gaze and head direction). Future research that employs
interactive joint-task paradigms to the study of social at-
tention promises to aid understanding of the contextual
and social factors that determine orienting (see Atkinson,
Doneva, Simpson & Cole, under revision). As such, these
approaches may also shed light on the underlying mech-
anisms determining attention to other’s actions.
Summary and future directions
The aim of this review has been to highlight the diverse
ways in which researchers have examined attention to
other’s actions. Despite the evidence drawn together in
the preceding sections, the mechanisms underlying atten-
tion to observed action have not received nearly the de-
gree of systematic investigation that has been the case for
eye gaze and other social directional cues (Birmingham &
Kingstone, 2009; Frischen et al., 2007). Action may be a
strong signal indicating the direction of another’s atten-
tion (Langton & Bruce, 2000). It may also be a powerful
directional signal in its own right (Gervais et al., 2010).
Finally, observing the actions of others may also orient
attention because direct mapping, corepresentation, and
mirroring of another’s observed action may simulate the
same attentional processes as when that action is per-
formed (Falck-Ytter, 2012; Lindemann et al., 2011;
Welsh et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the influence of manual
action on attention and the relationship between manual
action and gaze for orienting has been the subject of no
integrated formal models in the literature.
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Perhaps the most critical direction for future research con-
cerns the place of attending to action as part of a range of pro-
cesses that are engaged during social contact. Some evidence
suggests that attention to manual action is necessary for process-
es that are engaged during social interactions (Chong, Williams,
Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2008; Longo & Bertenthal, 2009).
These processes include imitation and corepresentation of action
and determining the intentions of others (Knoblich & Sebanz,
2008). Dovetailingwith this view, evidence has emerged that the
same processes may determine whether or not people pay atten-
tion to the actions of others (Ondobaka et al., 2012). A lack of
clarity on the direction of these relationships parallels a similar
debate that has emerged concerning attention to eye gaze and
head direction (Cole et al., 2015; Teufel et al., 2010;Wiese et al.,
2012). Finally, questions still remain regarding when manual
action is selected in natural scenes as a cue for attention, along-
side competing social signals. Using eye-movement paradigms,
compelling evidence has emerged in favour of the primacy of
head and eye gaze selection in such scenes (Birmingham,
Bischof, & Kingstone, 2008). Nonetheless, early work using
these techniques leaves open the question of whether this find-
ing persists when the scenes in question are presented as part
shared manual tasks or in the presence of action-focused narra-
tives (Yarbus & Riggs, 1967).
A final concern for this field, as suggested by research on
gaze selection and joint action, is the need to understand at-
tention to action in ecologically valid contexts (see Skarratt
et al., 2012). This approach has the ability to underscore the
pervasiveness of effects observed in the lab yet also reveal
subtleties that were not previously apparent. For example,
recent work in both the gaze and action cueing fields has
underlined the reflexive nature of basic orienting processes,
even across a range of social contexts (Cole et al., 2012;
Hietanen & Leppänen, 2003). Nonetheless, real social inter-
actions and realistic social stimuli have revealed novel find-
ings that are not present in traditional lab approaches, which
employ schematic or otherwise artificial stimuli (Risko,
Laidlaw, Freeth, Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2012; Richardson
& Gobel, 2015; Skarratt et al., 2010). There exists a range of
different methods that can all be thought to represent an in-
crease in ecological validity from early lab-based approaches.
A pressing challenge for present social attention research is
reconciling these disparate paradigms in order to develop rich
models of how we attend to other’s actions.
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